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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as 
a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 
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The Commission proposal for a directive concerning general product 
safety, discussed by this Workshop, is a noteworthy and typical expression 
of the specific tasks and problems of European legislative policy. The 
immediate objective of the proposal is a harmonization of product safety 
law.
The legitimation and interest of the Community in taking on this 
area of law is beyond doubt. Various regulations which guarantee product 
safety constitute barriers to trade which, by virtue of Article 36 EEC, 
are not in principle surmountable by applying the principle of free 
movement of goods. The harmonization of product safety law , however, is 
only a necessary and by no means a sufficient condition to guarantee the 
freedom of Community internal trade. It is not only product safety law, 
but even more so, and primarily, "private” standardization which are 
responsible for barriers to trade in the Common Market. This perception 
was decisive for the Community when in the context of its intensification 
of internal market policy it took up Europeanization of standards. At the 
same time it committed itself and Member States to a basic legislative 
policy decision that binding product safety law would be confined to 
laying down essential safety requirements in the form of general clauses, 
with their specifications being left to private standardization.
The draft General Product Safety Directive now submitted by the 
Commission should therefore be seen not merely as a response to 
differences in product safety legislation in Member States, but should be 
understood in the overall context of Community policy. The reconstruction 
of this twofold relationship to the product safety law of Member States 
and to the Community's more recent internal market policy is the object of 
this paper.
The product safety legislation of Member States cannot be even 
approximately fully covered; a survey of typical regulatory patterns in 
product safety law and their inter-penetration with standards must suffice 
(I below). These inter-dependencies will then be analysed at Community 



























































































development of Community law, the changes in primary Community law brought 
about by the SEA (Single European Act) and relevant ECJ case law will 
first be dealt with (II below), then the Europeanization of standards (III 
below). Discussion of the Commission's proposal will then build on that 
foundation (IV below).
I. Regulatory Patterns in Safety Law
The law of product safety is a tortuous set of areas that 
functionally belong together though autonomous from the point of view of 
legal systematics. There are reasons for this complexity. On the one 
hand, the State is compelled, in a scarcely reversible development, to 
take on ever-new responsibilities for the safety interests of citizens - 
in constitutional law this is expressed in the recognition in principle of 
the corresponding duty on the State to provide protection1 2. On the other 
hand, this very expansion of responsibilities forces the State to realize 
its own limitations. The reaction to this is the development or
intensification of cooperative networks among national and "private" 
2organizations .
1. Liability law as indirect safety regulation
If the regulatory tasks of relevant areas of law are considered, 
product safety law certainly also includes manufacturer liability and 
product liability law. Admittedly, private liability law works only 
indirectly at the level of product safety, by providing penalties for the 
infringement of "transactional duties" (para. 23 of the German Civil Code) 
or the marketing of "defective products" (e.g. Article 6 of the Community
1. See among the more recent literature G. Hermes, Das Grundrecht auf 
Schütz von Leben und Gesundheit. Schutzpflicht und Schutzanspruch, 1987; 
E. Klein, 'Grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht des Staates', NJW 1989, 1633 ff.; 
H.-W. Micklitz, Consumer Rights, typescript Bremen 1989 (Section IV.2).
2. See H. Voelzkov, J. Hilbert, G. Bohlens, 'Wettbewerb durch
Kooperation - Kooperation durch Wettbewerb: Zur Funktion und
Funktionsweise der Normungsverbande', in: M. Glagow and H. Willke (eds),
Dezentrale_____ Gesellschaf ssteuerung :_____ Problème_____ der_____ Integration




























































































3 4product liability directive ) . Here the courts are in principle 
autonomous in specifying transactional duties and safety criteria3 45 6. The 
standardization of consumer goods, which is de facto primarily responsible 
for their safety, is not legally binding. This principle has been 
reconfirmed by the Bundesgerichtshof in its compost-cutter ruling5. 
Despite this autonomy of private liability law, privately set standards do 
have enormous importance, and often determine the outcome of legal 
disputes. To be sure, judicial consideration of the results of 
standardization as a rule considers only the question whether safety 
standards provided for in these standards are up to the legally required 
level. But those who do not comply with the level of standards have 
little prospect of evading liability for negligence7 8910; those who assert
that a design they prefer that departs from the relevant standards meets
8the legally required level have to supply positive proof of this .
2. Safety marks and certificates as information policy measures
No-one is obliged to seek certification that his products meet a 
9safety standard . However there are good reasons to do so. Safety marks 
promote sales; and those who obtain certification can assume that trade 
supervisory offices will not check their products^. Therefore those who
3. O.J. L 210/1985, 29.
4. The debate on the control-function of liability law and its
shortcomings is not dealt with here; cf G. Briiggemeier, 'Produkthaftung 
und Produktsicherheit’, ZHR 152 (1988), 511 ff; J. Finsinger and J. Simon, 
'An Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and Product 
Liability Law of the Federal Republic of Germany', in: Ch. Joerges (ed), 
Product liability and product safety in the European Community, EUI 
Working Paper No.89/404, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 1989, 127 ff.
5. See Briiggemeier, Deliktsrecht, 1986, 578 ff; J. Schmidt-Salzer in:
Schmidt-Salzer and Hollman, Kommentar EG-Richtlinie Produkthaftung, 1986,
Art. 7, at 97; but see also P. Marburger, Die haftungs- und
versicherungsrechtliche Bedeutung technischer Regeln, VersR 1983, 597 ff.
6. See BGH, NJW 1987, 2222/2223 f.
7. See MtinchKomm-Mertens (2 edn), § 823 at no. 23 b and c and further 
cases there cited.
8. Briiggmeier, op. c i t. (fn. 4), 579.
9. For further details see J. Falke, Praxis der Nachmarkt-kontrolle 
technischer Gebrauchsgiiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, typescript, 
Bremen 1988, 64 ff.




























































































approach recognized test centres must take into account the fact that they 
must orient themselves primarily to the "generally recognized rules of 
technology" in the Federal Republic, as well as the "industrial safety and 
accident prevention regulations" and the DIN safety principles. 
Conferment of the mark is not contingent on compliance with relevant 
standards, but complying with them certainly makes testing easier.
3. Marketing bans as preventive measures
The most stringent form of preventive product safety policy is the 
laying down of binding design standards with compliance supervised by the 
authorities. For "normal" consumer goods, a comprehensive national 
control system cannot be seriously considered.
Yet German law in particular and the safety philosophy of the German 
Standards Organization (DIN) are committed to the idea of preventive 
protection against hazards11: by para.3 (1) of the Equipment Safety
Act (Geratesicherheitsgesetz GSG), design measures and safety-oriented 
manufacturing procedures should mean that product users and third parties 
are protected "against hazards of all kinds to life and health". The 
conversion of this general product safety obligation into specific safety 
requirements is brought about through reference to the "generally accepted 
rules of technology" (allgemein anerkannten Regeln der Technik) and the 
"provisions on safety at work and the prevention of accidents" 
(Arbeitsschutz- und Unfallverhutungsvorschriften).
This reference technique need not be explained in detail here. Let 
us merely emphasize two points, with an eye to the Europeanization of the 
reference technique in safety legislation:
- The general product safety obligation laid down by the GSG 
confirms the governmental obligation to provide protection 
for life and health.
11. See further Ch. Joerges, J. Falke, H.-W. Micklitz, G. Briiggemeiner, 
Die Sicherheit von Konsumgiitern und die Entwicklung der Europaischen 




























































































- Meeting this responsibility in the form of reference to 
standards takes place in a context of a highly developed 
network of cooperation which includes the Federal 
government (Federal Minister for Labour and Social 
Affairs), government administrative offices (Federal
Institution for Industrial Safety - Bundesanstalt fur 
Arbeitsschutz) and the Lander (their central labour 
offices - oberste Arbeitsbehorden), semi-governmental 
offices and statutory bodies (legal accident insurance 
agencies, independent test ^2Centres) and employer
organisations and trade unions.
4. Follow-up market controls as governmental protective obligations
One of the advantages of the reference technique is flexibility. 
The lists of rules of technology that correspond with the legally required 
safety levels can relatively quickly be supplemented or revised. These 
adaptive mechanisms apply first of all to sets of standards. They further 
have effects on test certification1-'*. They do not, however, guarantee 
that products found to be hazardous will be removed from the market, even 
though their further marketing is banned by § 3 GSG.
This lacuna in protection is rooted not in the scarce resources of 
the trade supervisory offices, but in the fact that even the severest 
sanction, namely the ordering of a ban pursuant to § 5 (1) & (2) GSG, 
merely prevents further marketing of a product. A banning order can only
indirectly contribute to recalling already marketed products through its
14publication or the threat of publication
In view of these striking weaknesses of public law follow-up market 
control it is hardly surprising that in product liability law the duties 
of the manufacturer to monitor and recall products are acquiring 
importance12 345. However the potential of using civil-law liability as a 
means of post-market control has structural limits. Private claims for
12. See in detail Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. 147 ff.
13. See J. Falke, op. cit. (fn. 9), at 73.
14. De facto, the instrument of the banning order is not even used this 
way; cf. J.Falke, op. cit., at 93 ff.




























































































recalls are pointless, since the potential claimants are endangered 
precisely because they do not recognize their endangerment (and therefore 
their claim). This paradox of private recall claims could be resolved 
only by recognizing possibilities of class actions. With the law as it 
stands, however, such powers of action are recognized only where 
infringements of recall duties can be termed distortions of competition - 
and even this recognition is to be found for the moment only in the 
literature1^.
Follow-up market controls are, we have to conclude, the poor 
relation of German product safety law. The relevance of this finding for 
legal policy is, as we know, controversial16 7 189. It is however indisputable 
that the plausibility of the requirement for more follow-up market 
controls increases where the national market is open to imported goods 
whose design and manufacture is not included in the national networks of
preventive safety techniques and cannot be checked at the frontiers. We 
18shall return to this point
II. Framework Conditions in Community Law
If, then, private liability law, information policy measures and 
product safety legislation are partly indirectly and partly directly 
intermeshed with standardisation, any effort to come to grips with the 
product safety problem on the Community level would have to deal with the 
interrelationship between safety law and standardisation. This basically 
very simple consideration explains first why the Community had to expand 
its harmonization activities into the field of standardisation. But it
also explains why the Council's Resolution of 7 May 1985 on "a new
19approach on technical harmonisation and standards” not only led to 
intensification of European standardization activities but has now brought 
efforts at extension of European product safety law. Legally, of course,
16. See H. Herrmann, 'Die Riickrufhaftung des Produzenten', BB 1985, 1801 
ff, 18L0 ff and further.
17. See on the German discussion J. Falke, op. cit. (fn. 9), 25ff.
18. Below at III.2 and IV.2.b.



























































































this sort of explanation only raises two supplementary questions: does the 
Community have the powers necessary to implement such a policy, and still 
more important, is it subject to qualitative restrictions as regards its 
commitment to the internal market and product safety?
1. The Community's powers and its qualitative restrictions
In its consumer protection and information policy resolutions of 
20 211975 and 1981 , the Council decisively favoured the view that the 
protection of consumer health and safety belongs among the tasks of the 
Community described in Article 2 EEC. In the practice of Community
policy, these programmatic statements have left no great traces. Only the
22European accident information system set up in 1981 but still not finally 
23consolidated , and the so-called rapid information system introduced in
24 251984 and extended by the Council's resolution of 21 December 1988 can be
2 6counted as visible results of the consumer policy programme . The
27Directive concerning Liability for Defective Products , frequently seen 
as a legislative act motivated by consumer policy, keeps rigidly in its 
justification to the terms of Article 100 EEC. The numerous safety
provisions of Community law, to be found in all directives on the 
harmonization of national product regulations, have always been
interpreted functionally - as necessary conditions for guaranteeing free 
28intra-Community trade *245678
20. O.J. C 92/1975, 1.
21. O.J. C 133/1981, 1.
22. O.J. L 229/1981, 1.
23. See 0.•J. L 109/1986, 23 as well as the Report concerning a
demonstration project with a view to introducing a Community system of 
information on accidents involving consumer products, COM (89) 827 final 
of 20.12.1988 and the communication of the Commission concerning financing 
O.J. C 300/1989, 14.
24. O.J. L 70/1984, 16.
25. O.J. L 17/1989, 51; cf. the preparatory Report of the Commission of 
12.3.1988, O.J. C 146/1988, 8.
26. Perhaps also the rather unique Directive concerning products which, 
appearing to be other than they are, endanger the health or safety of 
consumers: O.J. L 192/1987, 49.
27. See above fn. 3.
28. See further Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn. 11), 252 ff. (For food 




























































































This reticence was quite in line with a traditional conception of 
Community legislative competence. As J.H.Kaiser was still arguing in 
1980/ such "borderline areas" as health and consumer protection are
"separated by a gulf" from the Community's powers mentioned in the 
29Treaty . The conclusion was that by adopting a product liability 
directive the Community would already have exceeded its powers^. This
position was also put forward even after the SEA came into force^1. But
32for two reasons it has become (even ) harder to justify them. For on the 
one hand/ Article 130 r EEC now explicitly commits the Community to the 
goal of protecting human health/ and on the other hand Article 100 a (3) 
EEC enjoins the Commission to ground its proposals for measures to achieve 
the internal market "on a high level of protection". Admittedly, these 
two provisions belong to different policy areas. It is only for
environmental protection that explicitly comprehensive Community powers 
have been established. But by Article 130 r (2) (2) EEC, the Community's 
environmental policy commitment must have effect in all policy areas, and
specifically also in projects on internal market policy, taken up pursuant 
33to Article 100 a EEC . Accordingly, the allocation of product standards 
to Article 100 a EEC and its internal market objective cannot remove the 
Community's substantive commitment to the goal of health protection. 29301
29. 'Grenzen der EG-Zustandigkeit', EuR 1980, 97 ff., 113.
30. See for example B. Borner, 'Die Produkthaftung Oder das vergessene 
Gemeinschaftsrecht', in Festschrift fur Hans Kutscher 1981, 43 ff.
31. See especially on the Product Liability Directive, G. Fichna, 'EG- 
Kommisssion und Ministerrat als Gesetzgeber?', RIW 1988, 887 ff., 891.
32. On the justification of Community consumer policy powers before 
entry into force of the SEA, see N. Reich, Forderung und Schütz diffuser 
Interessen durch die Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 1987, 42 ff.; B. 
Langeheine in: E. Grabitz, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Art. 100 at no. 28 
ff. with further references; on the parallel discussion in relation to 
environmental protection see E. Grabitz, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Art. 
130 r, at 1 ff. sect. II; E. Rehbinder, R. Stewart, 'Environmental 
Protection Policy' (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. Weiler (eds), 
Integration through Law, Vol. A.2.2.), 1985, 21 ff.
33. See K. Hailbronner, 'Der "nationale Alleingang" im
Gemeinschaftsrecht am Beispiel der Abgasstandards fur Pkw', EuGRZ 1989, 
101 ff, 105 f.; D.H. Scheuing, 'Umweltschutz auf der Grundlage der 



























































































The formula of a "high" level of protection suggests, by being 
directed merely to the Commission and not to the Council, freedom of 
action substantively restricted by the "across the board" clause of 
Article 130 r (2) (2) EEC and in practice by Article 100 a (4) and (5): 
The Community must in its internal market policy either itself implement 
the relatively highest level of protection of life and health - confirming 
the control test of Article 100 a (4) - or else have it respected by 
safeguard clause procedures. At the same time there seems no prospect of 
distinguishing between protection of health against environmental risks 
(Article 130 r (1) EEC), against risks at work (Article 118 (1) EEC) and 
in the consumer sphere. Health protection is conceivable only as an end 
in itself. Its normative dignity cannot depend on the sources of that 
endangerment. But in practical terms too, in designing standards for 
products, however, one can hardly differentiate between environmental
risks, risks at work and the risks to consumers. It is possible to
34distinguish only between "process" and "product" regulations
All this compels us in my view to see health protection altogether 
as at least a protective obligation of the Community. It would even seem 
reasonable to go a step further: the qualitative obligations on Community 
action show, through their links with possibilities of action remaining 
with the Member States, that Community law recognises a national duty to 
protect life and health"*5. But this protective obligation must then be 
taken account of by the Community itself. Member States cannot therefore 
be prevented from responding, in areas covered by harmonization measures
pursuant to Article 100a EEC, to newly recognized dangers by new 
36measures . This one-sided "opting up" can be prevented by the Community 
only by making its legal harmonization measures revisable from the outset, 3456
34. On the terminology see E. Rehbinder and R. Stewart, op. cit. (fn
32) , 9 ff.
35. See H.-W. Micklitz, op. cit. (fn. 2), section III.
36. On this reading of Art. 100 a (4), see Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit.
(fn. 11), 373 ff with further citations; and from the more recent 
literature, especially K. Hailbronner, op. cit. (fn. 33), 109 ff.; P.-C. 
Miiller-Graff, 'Die Rechtsangleichung zur Verwirklichung des
Binnenraarktes', EuR 1989, 107 ff. 148 ff.; D.H. Scheuing, op. cit. (Fn.




























































































that is, by providing in secondary Community law the possibilities of
37action that make it possible to react to newly recognized dangers . This 
interpretation of the obligations on Community action is entirely 
compatible with the differing structure of Community powers in environment 
policy and in internal market policy: the point is not the allocation of 
new powers but qualitative obligations in carrying out legislative policy
tasks unavoidably bound up with the harmonization of the law of Member 
38States
2. The mutual recognition of product regulations in the ECJ's case law
The thesis that the Community takes a national responsibility for 
life and health as a basis and has to take over corresponding protective 
obligations in assuming regulatory tasks is undoubtedly compatible with 
the system of Articles 30 and 36 EEC. As regards the interpretation of 
these latter provisions in recent ECJ case law, however, this requires 
further justification. It is well known that the Commission, originally
in its communication on "the consequences of the Cassis de Dijon judgment 
39of 20 February 1979" and then in its "White Paper on completion of the 
40internal market" put forward the view that products properly manufactured
and marketed in one Member State could be sold without restriction in the
others, because the "objectives of national legislation are essentially 
41equivalent"
The Court of Justice is more cautious in choice of words and in the 
practice of its decisions. The equivalence of Member States' provisions 
on health protection that underlies the move from the principle of 
"country of destination" to that of "country of origin" is not a "fact", 3789401
37. See further below at III.2 and IV. 1.
38. Cf. already Ch. Joerges, 'The New Approach to Technical
Harmonisation and the Interests of Consumers' (1986), in: R. Bieber, R. 
Dehousse, J. Pinder, J.H.H. Weiler (eds), 1992: One European Market?, 
1988, 175 ff., 179; it is only with entry into force of the SEA that it
can be taken that this position has been laid down normatively.
39. O.J. C 256/1980, 2.
40. Luxembourg 1985, para. 61 ff., 77 ff.




























































































or even a largely completed development; nor does it simply follow from 
the fact that all Member States have equally good intentions. Equivalence 
must rather be established practically in each case, and is, as the
relevant cases show, often not establishable. Here the Court exercises
42caution in reviewing non-harmonized national law . In foodstuffs law
Member States may take account of national eating habits and the situation 
43of their population . The ECJ explicitly allows Member States a 
prerogative of judgement in the central normative question for health
protection and product safety policy of what risks ought to be tolerable 
44or ought to be limited . Admittedly, Community law has an effect on the 
exercise of this legislative policy competence. Member States must take 
account of the findings of international scientific research
particularly the work of the Community's scientific foodstuffs
45Committee . This necessity to take account of research does not confer 
legal quality on the statements of scientific experts. But it does make
it possible to verify the legitimacy of national measures, and further
46means that these measures must be structured so as to be revisable 
This precept of revisability has so far been applied by the ECJ only to
prohibitions. It must however also apply to permits, and is in particular
47also binding on the Community . It means not only that interested 
parties are to be given the right to have licensing of an additive 
verified "in an easily accessible procedure that can be completed within 423567
42. See on the following Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn 11), 321 ff.
and from the literature to date especially 0. Brouwer, 'Free Movement of 
Foodstuffs and Quality Requirements: Has the Commission got it wrong?', 
CML Rev. 1988, 237 ff.; U. Everling, 'Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zum
freien Warenverkehr im Binnemarkt', ZLR 1989, 304 ff.; A. Falkenstein, 
Freier Warenverkehr in der EG: Staatliche Behandelsbehinderungen und
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen - Erkennen und Abwehren, 1989, 120 ff.
43. See ECR (1984), 409 - Nisin; (1984), 3263 - Heijn; (1984), 2367 -
Melkunie; (1985), 3887 - Motte.
44. ECR (1981), 3277 - Biologische produkten.
45. In the now decisive wording of the "Beer judgment" of 12 March 1987,
Case 178/84 at margin no. 44 (ECR 1987, 1262): "...the work of the 
Community's Scientific Committee for Food, the Codex Alimentarius
Committee of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO) and 
the World Health Organization...".
46. ECR (1986), 1067 - Mirepoix; (1986), 1521 - Muller; "Beer judgement" 
(fn. 45), margin no. 45.




























































































an appropriate time" . The ECJ additionally calls for "technological",
"economic" and "psychological" reasons for use of additives to be taken 
49into account . Once again, this does not mean that such findings must be 
respected legally or that the mere circumstance that they have been 
accepted in the country of manufacture must lead to recognition in the 
country of destination50. To be sure the ECJ meets the interest in
unhindered implementation of free movement of goods by placing the burden
51of proof of "justification" of a ban on additives on the banning State
This development of the rules on burden of proof has been seen as a
52"decisive turn" in ECJ case law . It is true that the call for a 
positive demonstration of damage to health would severely limit a 
preventive policy of reacting to risks by bans. It need not however be 
inferred from decisions actually taken that this is the significance of 
the ECJ's rule on burden of proof. To date the case law can in my view 
still be understood as requiring the banning State to provide proof of 
health hazards - and on this interpretation it remains compatible with the 
prerogative of Member States to assess such hazards5 .̂
In the area of technical safety law the ECJ's case law is sparser
and certainly in need of clarification. The most important decision, the
54one on French wood-working machines , at any rate decisively confirms the 
discretion of Member States in safety policy. Every Member State has the
48
48. "Beer Judgement" (Fn. 45), at margin no. 45 f.
49. See ECR (1983), 2445 - Sandoz? (1985), 3887 - Motte; (1986), 1521 -
Muller; (1987), 1262 - Beer Case.
50. See G.A. Dauses, Die neuere Rechtsprechung des EuGH im Lebens- 
mittelrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtung des sog. Bier-Urteils, ZLR 
1987, 243 ff., 260 f.
51. See ECR (1983), 2445 - Sandoz as well as the precedents reported by
Th. van Rijn, 'A Review of the Case Law of the Court of Justice on
Articles 30 to 36 EEC in 1986 and 1987', CML Rev. 1988, 593 ff.
52. See J. Sedemund, 'Statement on the concept of the free movement of 
goods and the reservation for national action under Art. 36 EEC Treaty', 
in: J. Schwarze (ed), Discretionary Powers of the Member States in the 
Field of Economic Policies and their Limits under the EEC Treaty, 1988, 25 *534
ff., 29 ff.
53. A product-related rule on burden of proof, differently worded for
pesticides and for food additives, has no future, as van Rijn, op. cit.
(fn. 51), emphasizes as against ECR (1986) 1074 - Mirepoix.




























































































right to ban the import of work equipment that does not demonstrably meet 
its level of protection - and the proof must be brought by those seeking 
to make the import55 567. Statistical details on accident figures in the 
countries of manufacture and of destination are not decisive, since the 
reason might be that in the country of origin the hazardousness of the 
machines is compensated by greater skill on the part of users5**.
In its new "Communication on the free movement of foodstuffs within 
the Community"5 ,̂ the Commission has clarified its view on the 
consequences of ECJ case law for the law of Member States. The Commission 
is concerned above all with delimiting the regulations in need of 
harmonization in areas where duties of recognition can be derived from 
primary Community law. These delimitations and the effects of Community 
law can however also be described positively: the Community law 
requirements must remain compatible with the legitimate health policy 
interests of Member States. This compatibility requirement concerns not 
only Member States, but also the Community itself. In other words, while 
the compatibility rules developed by the ECJ are directed to Member 
States, at the same time they circumscribe the content of the overall 
Community law. They entail that Community law controls should also take 
account of findings as to health hazards and must not lead to a 
deterioration of the level of protection attained in Member States.
3. Requirements on cooperation by the administrative authorities of Member 
States
Public law of product safety is, in practice, mainly administrative 
law. It is in principle by way of administrative acts that the various 
competent authorities make legally binding measures. These measures 
specify the general clause of safety law in a binding manner by refusing 
permits or requiring the elimination of potential hazards58 *. But the
55. At margin no. 17 ff.
56. At margin no. 21.
57. O.J. C 271/1989, 3.





























































































Community has no genuine administrative powers in the area of product 
safety policy. In both dimensions of its internal market policy - in 
guaranteeing the freedom of Community internal trade and in having safety 
requirements incorporated into Member States' law - it is dependent on the
administrations of Member States which means that administrative
59enforcement follows the national provisions that apply in each case 
a) Secondary Community law
The Community's most important instrument for implementing concerted
administrative practice is the adoption of obligations for mutual
recognition of administrative decisions. The Community's power to impose
60such obligations on Member States is derived from Article 100 EEC , and,
particularly in product safety law is an unavoidable necessity61 62. But it
62nevertheless means, as M.Seidel rightly stresses, an "approfondissement" 
of the process of integration the implications 63 of which have not been 
thought through thoroughly since it restricts the administrative
sovereignty of Member States in principle presupposed by the Treaty. At 
any rate, if the Community postulates reciprocal binding of national 
administrative authorities, the legal homogeneity of the law to be 
implemented must be guaranteed, and presumably also the equivalence of the
59. See ECR (1983), 2633 - Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH; W. Rengeling, 'Das 
Zusammenwirken von Europaischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem, 
inbesondere deutschem Recht', DVB1. 1986, 306 ff.; Judgement of ECJ of 
21.9.1989, in cases 46/87 and 227/88, EuGRZ 1989, 395 (margin no. 32 ff.) 
- Hochst.
60. See Th. Bruha, 'Rechtsangleichung in der Europàischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Deregulierung durch "neue Strategie"?', ZaoRV 
1986, 1 ff., 20 ff. with further references.
61. See for the law on chemicals E. Rehbinder, 'Harmonisierung des 
Chemikalienrechts?', in: Gesellschaft fiir Rechtspolitik (ed), 
Chemikalienrecht, 1986, 79 ff., 97 ff.; and for the law on pharmaceuticals
D. Hart, 'Drug Safety as a Means of Consumer Protection: The Approximation 
of Laws in the EC Medicinal Products Market and Its Limitations', JCP 12 
(1989), 343 ff.
62. 'Grundsâtzliche Rechtsprobleme bei der Verwirklichung des 
Gemeinsamen Marktes', in: S. Magiera (ed), Entwicklungsperspektiven der 
Europàischen Gemeinschaft, 1985, 169 ff., 180 ff.
63. E.g. in the light of Article 24 GG and the federal structure of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, public liability of authorities of other 



























































































"quality" of the administrative practice assured . At any rate, such 
guarantees are nothing less than legally indispensable requirements for 
the adoption of recognition obligations. They are not sufficient 
conditions for de facto uniform decision-making practice. All experience 
tends instead to show that "real harmonization" requires at least a
continual exchange of information, oriented towards practical coordination 
65of implementation 
b) Primary Community law
The ECJ's case law has not only developed duties of recognition and 
requirements of cooperation in harmonized legal areas, but derived such 
obligations from primary Community law too. The principles developed here 
by the ECJ complement each other.
For the harmonized areas, the starting point in determining the 
scope of recognition obligations is the content of the secondary Community 
law. "It is only when Community directives provide for complete 
harmonization of all measures necessary to protect the health of humans 
and animals" that recourse to Article 36 EEC does not apply64 56 67. This 
degree of perfection is not as a rule attained by Community law. But this 
does not mean that Member States and their administrations are not subject 
to any binding by Community law. If, say, national law were, in the 
interests of health protection, to require certificates on the composition 
and origin of medicaments and the importer is unable to secure these 
certificates from the manufacturer, then the national authorities must
actively support him, for instance by organizing an exchange of the
6 7necessary documents with the authorities of the exporting State . If 
Community-wide health checks are prescribed, this rules out systematic
64. On the enhanced requirements made on relevant agencies in Member 
States by directives under the new approach, see III.2.
65. See E. Rehbinder, op. cit. (fn. 61), 133 ff.; D. Hart, op. cit., 
(fn. 61).
66. ECJ judgement of 7.3.1989, Case no. 215/87, NJW 1989, 2185 - 
Schumacher.




























































































frontier checks, but not additional police health investigations^^.
The duties developed in the context of (partially) harmonized areas 
operate also in non-harmonized areas. Even where health protection and 
its organisations have been left within the sphere of competence of Member 
States, these are obliged to refrain from investigation and permit 
procedures where the exporting State has carried out comparable analyses
and the results are available^. This rule is supported by a "general
70principle of mutual trust among authorities in Member States" . Probably 
the furthest-reaching effects to date have been developed by the ECJ 
outside health protection: French regulations that textile importers had 
to verify that textile markings of imports complied with French provisions 
had to allow proof of this by comparably reliable certifications from the 
exporting country68 9701 723.
Summarizing, we may say that the ECJ is in its case law on duties of
recognition and cooperation certainly promoting "a dove-tailing and
72intermeshing of the administrative activities of Member States" . This 
case law certainly means that the density of checks by the authorities can 
be reduced, and it may be that the ECJ is assessing the reliability of 
national checks rather too optimistically. However, its legal principles 
for recognition of measures by the authorities in the health protection 
area remain just as compatible with criteria for recognition of product
regulations as with the protective obligations expressed in the new
73provisions of the EEC Treaty : the duties of recognition and cooperation
68. ECR (1976), 1871 - Simmenthal? (1979), 3369 - Denkavit; on the
charges for border controls see the summary in ECJ judgement of 27.9.1988, 
Case no. 18/87, NJW 1988, 3081 - Commission/FRG; on the safety controls 
for new ventures see ECR (1986), 1855 - Schloh; Judgement of 11.6.1987, 
Case no. 406/85, (1987), 2525 - Gofette and Gilliard; Judgement of
17.6.1987, Case no. 154/85, (1987), 2717 - Commission/ Italy.
69. ECR (1981), 3277, 3290 ff. - Biologische produkten.
70. ECJ judgement of 11.5.1989, Case no. 25/88, ECR 1989, - Ministère
Public/ Wurmser & Norlain.
71. ECJ, Case no. 25/88 (fn. 70).
72. M. Seidel, op. cit. (fn. 62), 181.



























































































are to bring about the breakdown of trade barriers, not the breakdown of a 
nationally achieved "legitimate'' level of protection.
Ill Europeanization of Standardization
Community law thus sees product safety law as not merely a barrier 
to trade. Instead, it assumes that Member States bear a positive 
responsibility for health protection and that wherever the Community takes 
this responsibility upon itself it too assumes such an obligation to 
protect life and health. ECJ case law on the mutual recognition of 
product regulations and official measures in the area of health protection 
checks national law for its compatibility with the obligation under 
Community law, with an eye to the freedom of Community internal trade. 
But at the same time this case law subjects achievement of this objective 
to substantive obligations - namely one of compatibility, which rules out 
the lowering of safety standards based on health policy, both with 
recognition of product regulations and with that of official control 
measures.
In the phase of conceptual preparation of the Community's new 
standardization policy, the amendment of the EEC Treaty by the SEA 
provisions was not yet foreseeable, and the principles in the ECJ's case 
law on the scope of the Cassis de Dijon judgment had not yet been
fully developed. The development of the new harmonization policy,
74starting with the Information Directive of 1983 and then systematically 
taken up with the "new approach on technical harmonization and 
standards"74 5came about because of the crisis of the "traditional" policy 
of harmonization of laws. These crises resulted both from the over- 
cumbersome legislative procedures of the Community, bound by the unanimity 
requirement of Article 100 EEC, and from the fact that traditional
74. O.J. L 109/1983, 8? revised by Reg. 88/182 of 22.3.1988, O.J. L
81/1988, 7§.




























































































harmonization policy in principle started7*^ rom consistent 
"nationalization" of safety regulation going as far as the details of 
technical regulations. The primary objective of the move to the 
regulatory technique of reference to standards was to overcome these two 
reasons for the stagnation of harmonization policy, which reinforced and
conditioned each other76 7 *79. The Cassis doctrine was not understood by the
78Commission - despite its over-extensive interpretation of the ECJ - as a 
substitute for legal harmonization in any way , but instead as an 
additional legitimation for the new harmonization strategy. The ECJ's 
case law had established a "kind of presumption" for the equivalence of 
product safety law in the Community, and the point was now to make the
"right to this presumption" operational and "organize the conditions under
79which the presumption" is to be denied
This brief comparison between the present state of primary Community 
law and the starting point for the new approach should have adequately 
clarified a point that is in any case undeniable: the harmonization policy 
principles decided in 1985 ought not to be treated as a definitive, 
completed codification. The new approach is more appropriately to be 
understood as a legislative policy project in need of clarification, which 
must respond flexibly to difficulties of implementation and take account
of the general advancement of Community law. The nature of these 
difficulties and the possibilities of overcoming them are more clearly
recognizable today than five years ago. Three problem areas need priority
treatment here: public-law product safety obligations, the functions of
safeguard clause procedures and the certification of the safety conformity 
of products.
76. With the well known exception of the Low Voltage Directive, O.J. L 
77/1973, 29.
77. See the aforementioned Commission Communication concerning a new
approach on technical harmonisation and standards, COM (85) 19 final of
19.1.1985, 3.
8. See above II.2.
79. See for example para. 64 of the White Paper (fn.
Commission Communication of 19.1.1985 (fn. 77), 5.



























































































1. Essential safety requirements and general product safety obligation
The Model Directive mentioned above, laying down the structures of 
the new harmonization policy, contains statements of safety law which are 
technically utterly vague and remain unclear in their legislative policy 
consequences. The general technical description of the level of safety to 
be guaranteed in the new directives corresponds to the formulation of 
para. 3 (1) GSG. This states that "any products may be placed on the
market only if they do not endanger the safety of persons, domestic
animals or goods when properly installed and maintained and used for the
8 0purposes for which they were intended" . "In certain cases," it
continues, however, "in particular with regard to the protection of
workers and consumers the conditions set out in this clause may be
81strengthened (forseeable use)"
This modification already shows that the clarification of the level
of safety in terms of the context of use of products is to be provided in
8 2the directives themselves. This corresponds to the much-criticized 
description of the regulatory content in safety law of the new directive: 
"The basic safety requirements" are to be formulated in these directives 
sufficiently precisely so as "to enable the certification bodies straight 
away to certify products as being in conformity, having regard to those 
requirements in the absence of standards"80 123 84. The indefiniteness that a 
safety-law general clause must have is thus not in the least consistently
reduced by the reference method, but more by a procedure specific to each 
84area
80. See Section B II before 1 in the so-called Model Directive on the 
new approach (fn. 75).
81. Model Directive Section B II 3.
82. See J. Pelkmans, Opheffing van technische handelsbelemmeringen in de 
EG, 1985, 161.
83. Model Directive, Section B III 1.1.
84. In this connection see also the "criteria for choosing the priority 
areas in which this new approach could initially be applied", in the 



























































































In the practice of Community policy, this indecisiveness has since 
led to a confusing multiplicity of legal safety regulations:
- The Directive on Simple Pressure Vessels^repeats, in Article 2, the 
general formulation of the Model Directive, but then contains in 
Annex 1 surprisingly detailed legally binding safety requirements.
- The Directive concerning the Safety of Toys^requires the normal 
behaviour of children to be taken into account, and in its Annexes 
converts the safety-law principles previously developed in European 
standardization work into law in binding fashion.
8 7- The Directive on construction materials describes the safety 
requirements against "normally foreseeable effects" comprehensively, 
but in general terms; having regard to the tension arising from the 
scope and the indefiniteness of its requirements, it provides for the 
production of "technical specifications" and "basic documents", 
through which the necessary connections between the essential 
requirements and (in particular) standardization contracts and 
contracts for "guidelines for European certification...can be 
created" (Article 3 (3)).
88- The Directive relating to Machinery , the comprehensive regulatory 
functions of which are like those of the German GSG, repeats the 
Model Directive in its general definition of the required level of 
safety (Article 2 (1)), but then clarifies this definition in an 
annex (I 1.1.2 a and c) to the effect that protection is also to be 
guaranteed for cases even where risks of accident arise from 
foreseeable abnormal situations.
89- The Draft Directive on Mobile Machinery likewise keeps to the 85679
85. O.J. L 220/1987, 48.
86. O.J. L 187/1988, 1.
87. O.J. L 40/1989, 12 (Art. 3 para. 1 with Annexe I).
88. O.J. L 183/1989, 9.



























































































formulations of the Model Directive, but for machines which may "also 
be intended for use by non-professional users" requires that safety
precautions be taken "which could reasonably be expected in a non- 
90professional workplace"
91This list is not complete , but the differentiations it 
nevertheless adequately establishes are not surprising. There are 
objectively justified reasons why the required level of safety should be 
specified in the light of the hazard potential and use context of 
products. But secondary Community law at present lacks an overall legally 
binding reference that could be used to justify such differentiations. 
Similarly, the discrepancies between "public-law" and "private-law" 
Community law that arise without a general product safety obligation can 
scarcely be justified. The Product Liability Directive indeed obliges
Member States to protect their citizens' legitimate safety expectations
92through the law of liability . Undoubtedly, the private-law obligation
to market only safe products and the public safety obligations have
93different regulatory functions . But it would be no less than consistent
to flank the private-law safety obligation with a comprehensive public-law 
94general clause . In particular, this sort of general safety-law
reference framework for checking the content of national provisions 
against the criteria of primary Community law would be warranted, for two 
reasons. Firstly, it would lay down criteria by which Member States could 901234
90. Annex I, 1.1.2.
91. The special case of the Draft Directive on Active Implantable
Electromedical Equipment (Comm.(88) 717 final) concerns, by its very
nature, a preventive licensing system. The Directive relating to 
electromagnetic compatibility (O.J. L 139/1989, 19) keeps close to the 
Model Directive. This is also true of the Draft Directive on Appliances 
Burning Gaseous Fuels (O.J. C 42/1989, 5), which however also contains an 
extensive list of basic technical design requirements. The Directive on 
personal protective equipment (O.J. L 393/1989, 18) likewise provides for 
a general clause along the lines of the Model Directive (Article 2 (1)), 
but leaves unaffected the power of Member States to make further-reaching 
requirements to protect users (Article 2 (2)).
92. Cf. Article 6 taken together with the scope of the Product Liability 
Directive (fn. 3) as defined in more detail in its
Article 2.
93. See further under IV.2.



























































































orient themselves in areas not specifically regulated and which they would 
have to take account of in devising and re-shaping their own legal system. 
At the same time, it would be made clear that control by Community law 
over national law cannot be intended as a deregulation strategy aimed 
against justified safety interests.
2. Safeguard clause procedures and follow-up market controls
It is the explicit intention of the regulatory technique of 
reference to standards to take the load off Community legislative 
procedure. This unburdening effect ought not however lead to delegation 
to standards organisations of the legislative responsibility taken over by 
Community law for harmonizing safety requirements. For this reason, the 
new approach adopted two measures. Firstly, the development of European 
standards is prepared by standardization contracts from the Commission, 
and the outcome of European standardization must - like national standards
claimed to conform with the legally binding requirements - be recognized
95by the Commission in the procedure provided for by the Model Directive 
Secondly, and more important, the recognition of standards always 
establishes a mere presumpt ion of their safety conformity. This
limitation on their legal relevance means that the safety assessments made 
in the standards remain subject to revision. At the same time it means 
that Member States are, despite recognition of the safety conformity of 
standards by the Commission, bound only by the legally binding safety 
objectives and therefore remain entitled to give effect to their 
interpretations of the meaning of these objectives in measures to protect 
health and safety. According to the safeguard clause procedures embodied 
in the Model Directive, confirmed by Article 100 a (5) EEC and 
incorporated into individual directives since adopted, Member States are 
however obliged to have the conformity of their measures with Community 
law verified. Article 100 a (4) EEC opened up further possibilities for 
Member States to secure their safety policy interests. The dispute over 
interpretation of this provision^ is therefore only of limited
95.
96.




























































































importance. The broad formulation of the safety-law general clauses ought 
in any case to make it possible for Member States to declare any interest 
motivated by safety policy in the context of the safeguard clause 
procedure, so that the practical relevance of the dispute over 
interpretation of Article 100 a (4) EEC reduces to the question whether 
entitlement to a national measure is checked in the safeguard clause 
procedure (and therefore in the first place by the Commission) or in the 
new procedure introduced by Article 100 a (4) EEC.
The legislative policy function of the safeguard clause procedure is 
above all to keep safety policy assessments open to new knowledge. This
"sunset" function, which takes account of the reference of technical
97safety law to the Community's and Member States' safety obligations , is 
expressed above all in the fact that Member States, when justifying their 
measures, must in particular verify, according to the provision normally 
contained in Article 7 of the new directives, whether safety objectives 
have not been met, whether standards are being wrongly applied or are 
themselves faulty, and if necessary carry out such verification in order 
to disqualify hitherto recognized standards.
But the safeguard clause procedure is supposed to be able also to 
affect marketability of products directly, over and above this 
verification of the safety conformity of standards. According to Section 
B VII (2) of the Model Directive, the Commission, where it finds a measure 
taken by one Member State justified, has to "point out to" the "other 
Member States" that they are (ceteris paribus) likewise obliged to forbid 
marketing of the item concerned. The Model Directive does not itself 
contain a legal basis for this Community-wide applicability of a national 
measure. Where the Commission regards a Member State's measure as 
justified, it has no means available to compel active intervention by 
administrative bodies of other Member States. *89
97. See I above, before 1; 
law cf. BVerfG 25, 1, 12f. 
determination; BVerfG 49, 
Aircraft noise.
on the constitutional justification in German 
- Mills Act; BVerfG 50, 290, 335, 377f. - Co-



























































































The new directives have not filled in this lacuna in the Model
9 8Directive. For instance, the Toy Directive provides that Member States 
should "take all appropriate measures to withdraw the products from the
market, or to prohibit or restrict their placing on the market" (Article 7
99(1)), and the Machine Directive has a corresponding provision (Article 7 
(1)). Such provisions of Community law can scarcely be interpreted as an 
obligation to introduce such new instruments of action within Member 
States. Even were they so interpreted, they would be much too indefinite 
to guarantee even only approximately equivalent administrative practice in 
safety law.
In practice this means that the safeguard clause procedures can 
carry out both their internal market and safety functions only 
inadequately. The Community has to expect that the freedom of action at 
present open to national authorities will lead to new (subsequent) market 
segmentation, because the competent authorities in Member States will 
interpret the safety law general clauses differently and implement them 
with different instruments of action. But the Community is not in a 
position to apply, Community-wide, measures by one Member State which it 
regards as objectively justified, thereby meeting the justified safety 
expectations of the citizens of all Member States.
3. Safety assessment procedures and the protective obligation of the State
The Model Directive bindingly brought in the move to the regulatory 
technique of reference to standards, with particular regard to the 
procedure for acquiring safety criteria in Community law. As for the 
indispensable second element in all product regulation, namely the 
verification and certification of products' conformity with the standards 
set, all that the model directive contains is statements on the possible 
forms of such certification"^? The Council Resolution of 7 May 1985"^^ 
accordingly stressed that the new approach would have to be supplemented 9810
98. O.J. L 187/1988, 1.
99. Fn. 89.




























































































by "steps in connection with assessment of conformity". The need for such 
supplementation is indeed indisputable on the new approach. The 
presumption of safety conformity that establishes the right to access to 
markets in the Community depends, after all, not only on recognition of
European or national standards, but also on demonstration of product
102conformity with standards . If a manufacturer wishes to have recourse 
to the European deviation clause102 03 104, he is entirely dependent on 
attestation of the safety conformity of his product.
a) The Community's legal policy
The directives and draft directives through which the new approach 
was implemented have therefore also always had to develop solutions to the 
problems of certification. At the same time, the Commission has embarked 
on working out an approach to certification that systematically
supplements the Model Directive, and brought this to an interim 
104conclusion . These efforts at Europeanization of certification rest on 
two complimentary coordinating mechanisms105:
(1) Forms of safety assessment: In its Section B VIII devoted to
certification, the Model Directive contains a typology of possible safety 
attestations (conformity certificates and tests by third parties; test 
results by third parties; conformity declarations by the manufacturer, 
with and without monitoring systems; "other certification"). The 
preconditions for using the different forms of certification have not been 
specified, nor have the nature of the expected tests been clarified any 
further. Accordingly, in their regulations the new directives on forms of
102. See Section B V and VIII of the Model Directive.
103. Section B V 3 of the Model Directive.
104. See above all the Commission Document "A Policy Statement of the
Commission on Technical Specifications, Testing and Certification: The
Global Approach, COM III/3510/88 - Cert if. 88/10 of 29.11.1988 as well as 
the proposal for a Council Resolution on Conformity Assessment Procedures 
of 15.6.1989, O.J. C 31/1989, 3.
105. See on the following the analysis of H. Buerfeind, Die gegenseitige 
Anerkennung von Produktregelungen und Produktzert-ifizierungen im 




























































































certification and procedure must break conceptually new ground. The 
solutions have been correspondingly varied.
Thus, in the first relevant Directive, on Simple Pressure Vessels, 
design testing through construction sample testing and construction sample 
certification was given unexpected importance1 *̂*, whereas simple self- 
certification by the manufacturer was not provided for at all1^7. In the
Machine Directive too, testing of construction samples receives an area of
108application not planned in the Commission's original proposal . Also 
striking is the importance assigned in the new directives to quality
guarantee systems. This is true particularly of the Construction Products 
109Directive and also of the Directive on personal protective
,110equipment
In its proposal on conformity assessment procedures, the Commission 
has developed the approaches in the model directive and the new directives 
further, leading to eight "modules". This clarification of testing and 
assessment procedures is aimed at increasing their reliability and thus 
also facilitating mutual recognition of national certification. But the 
Commission proposal evidently presumes that clarification of test 
requirements alone will not suffice in order to "guarantee uniform 
interpretation and application of the modules"106 78911. Accordingly, the 
Commission itself should first of all ensure cooperation by the national 
testing and licensing bodies and in the longer term the European 
Organization for Certification and Testing should organize this 
coopérât ion.
106. (Fn. 85), Art. 8 Sect. 1 and Art. 10 as well as Art. 13.
107. In this connection cf. now also Annex I (i) of the Proposal on 
Conformity Assessment Procedures (fn. 104).
108. Cf. Article 8 of the Commission proposal (O.J. C 29/1988, 1) on the 
one hand, and Article 8 taken together with Annex IV para. 9 ff. of the 
Directive on Machinery (fn. 88) on the other.
109. (Fn. 87), Art. 13 f. taken together with Annex III.
110. O.J. L 399/1989, 18 (Art. 11).




























































































National experience in the area of certification shows that in order 
to specify technical standards, exchange of experience among test centres 
is necessary in order to arrive at equivalent test criteria and prevent a 
race to those centres that set low design requirements. This is still 
more true in the case of technical innovations and especially in areas 
where harmonized standards have not yet been worked out.
In product areas where manufacturers appeal directly to the binding 
basic safety requirements of directives, Europe-wide exchange of 
experience among test centres involved could be a preparatory stage in 
producing harmonized technical standards. Where technical standards have 
already been produced, important indications might emerge from the 
exchange of experience among test centres for applying the standards to 
new technical developments, as might knowledge of hazards. Reaching a 
pragmatic solution here is desirable also because the new approach, with 
its fixation on the difficult work of harmonization, has so far tended to 
neglect the necessary verification of standards. The safeguard clause 
procedure is oriented more towards exceptional hazard situations, and the 
procedures for verifying norms focus not on the advance of technical 
development and on the level of hazard, but on the proper incorporation 
into law of the general safety requirements.
(2) Requirements on certification centres: The mutual recognition of
national certification, which presupposes equivalent testing practice in 
Member States, is to be further guaranteed through requirements on the 
organization structure and working methods of national centres. The
annexes to the new directives and draft directives contain two differing
112regulatory patterns here: the list of criteria contained particularly 
in the Toy Directive113 and the Directive on Construction Materials114 is 
very vague115; in the other cases, specifically also116 in the Directive
112. See the evidence in H. Buerfeind, op. cit. (fn. 105)., 107.
113. Fn. 86.
114. Fn. 87.
115. All that is called for is the "necessary" equipment, the competence
and integrity of the staff and their impartiality, the maintenance of 
professional secrets and the taking out of liability insurance.



























































































on Machinery, it is considerably more substantial. Nevertheless, here too
the Commission evidently takes it that additional measures are essential
to guarantee equivalence of the tests required by the directives. The
future directives should therefore refer to the CEN/CENELEC standards on
117testing, certification and accreditation adopted in April 1989 and the
work of national centres should be coordinated within a comprehensive 
118structure of cooperation
These ideas are already followed in the Construction Products
Directive. This Directive has not only introduced bridgehead institutes
119to clarify the general safety requirements , but also assigned to these
120procedures the task of working out guidelines for certification
Additionally, this directive provides that national centres competent for
technical licensing, certification, monitoring and testing should "come
121together in a body" that cooperates closely . The step taken here to 
build up a cooperative infrastructure corresponds to the insight gained 
with specification of the certification modules, that the uniformity of
testing practice aimed at cannot be achieved solely by making the 
122procedural rules uniform
The Commission document on the "global approach" clarifies the 
cooperative structures aimed at. This document distinguishes among 
political, technical and horizontal elements of organization. While for 
the political element the Commission is to take over an initiative 
function and the "technical element" is concerned with working out 1789203
117. See A. Warner, 'Quo vadis Zertifizierung? Freie und gelenkte 
Entwicklung der Zertifizierung', DIN-Mitt. 68 (1989), 313 ff.
118. See H. Berghaus, 'Europaische Aktivitaten im Bereich der
Zertifizierung - Die Intentionen der Briisseler EG-Kommission', DIN-Mitt. 
68 (1989), 128 ff.; E. Previdi, 'Quo vadis Zertifizierung? Die Entwicklung 
in der EG', DIN-Mitt. 68 (1989), 203 f.
119. See above III.l at fn. 87.
120. See Art. 3, sect. 3 together with Art. 12 and Art. 20 sect. 4.
121. Art. 18 together with Annex II, point 2.
122. See further the reference to agreements on mutual recognition in
Article 9 (4) of the proposal for a Directive Concerning
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, including the mutual recognition of 
their conformity, O.J. C 211/1989, 12.



























































































arrangements for specific sectors, for the "horizontal element the 
foundation of a new organization, the 'European Certification and Testing 
Board'" is provided for. This board is to include government 
representatives, representatives of national certification centres and 
standardization institutions, manufacturers, trade unions and consumers. 
Performance of these "representative" functions is to be combined with 
that of the "executive" task of promoting agreements on mutual 
recognition.
b) Legal questions
With its efforts to build up an infrastructure for certification, 
the Commission is advancing into territory that has hardly been opened up 
legally. The question was raised, even against adoption of the regulatory 
technique of reference to standards of whether confining harmonization 
policy to general clauses in safety law is compatible with the prohibition
on delegation in Community law and the principle of institutional balance
124between Commission and Council . Against the accusation of infringing 
the ban on delegation, it may be stated that both European and national 
standards must go through a recognition procedure, and compliance with 
them always establishes only a presumption of the safety conformity of
standards124 25 12678. Such procedures are provided for, for instance, by the
126Directive on Simple Pressure Vessels where recourse is had to the
European "deviation clauses". By contrast, for instance, the Directive on
127 128Electro-Magnetic Tolerance , and also the Directive on Machinery , do
without formal confirmation of decisions of national centres by the
Commission. The fact that this abstention from testing at Community level
is in line with practical necessities is easy to see. This is
particularly true of the whole area of certification, which can reasonably
124. See above 1 as well as R.H. Lauwaars, 'The "Model Directive" on
Technical Harmonization', in: R. Bieber et al., op. cit. (fn. 38), 151
ff.; Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn. 11), 380 ff.; for discussion of the 
Low Voltage Directive see ibid., 339 f.
125. See 1 above.
126. (Fn. 85), Art. 17.
127. O.J. L 139/1989, 19, Art. 10.



























































































be handled only in de-centralized fashion. At the same time, however, the 
Commission's efforts to build up a framework system for certification and
underpin mutual recognition of national certificates by agreement confirm,
129as do statements from experienced practitioners , that the safety 
objectives of European directives as a rule do not provide any adequate 
guidance to decision for and against the safety conformity of the product 
and that all presentations of the requirements on national test centres 
formulated to date fail to eliminate the resulting leeway in decision. 
But this means that in the area of certification, legal powers on safety, 
which according to the new directives are incumbent on the Community, are 
transferred back to national level. The fact that all that is involved is
the establishment of presumptions of the safety conformity of products,
130which can be challenged in the safeguard clause procedure , changes
nothing. The fact that the presumptions of safety can be refuted
certainly does maintain the official responsibility for protecting health 
131and safety interests . But the ban on delegation in Community law also 
means that the Commission has itself to implement, through precise
measures, decision-making powers entrusted to it by secondary Community 
132law . To remove these reservations, directives that do not provide for 
any verification of national certification decisions by the Commission 
would have to distinguish between the regulation of forms of certification 
and the recognition of certification decisions. The Europeanization of 
certification ought then to seen as an inter-governmental task. But thei 
the question arises how the Community is to uphold its duties to protect 
life and health in the face of inadequacies of certification practice. 12930
129. Evidence of J. Falke, op. cit. (fn. 9), in fn. 42.
130. See 2 above.
131. See for the German Law R. Breuer, 'Direkte und indirekte Rezeption 
technischer Regeln durch die Rechtsordnung', AoR 101 (1976), 46 ff., 66.
132. ECR (1975), 1279/1307 - Rey Soda and the considerations of AG



























































































IV. The Tasks of a Directive on General Product Safety
In the three problem areas mentioned, the general product safety 
obligation, the Europeanization of follow-up market controls and 
conformity assessment, in which the linkage between standardization and 
product safety law has not yet been established, internal market policy 
objectives overlap with interests of product safety policy. It is in line 
with the logic of the new harmonization policy for the Commission here to
have first worked out its internal market policy concept and on several
133occasions announced the consequences for product safety law , but to
have waited until now to provide clear outlines of its ideas, through the
134Proposal for a Directive on General Product Safety
This Proposal for a Directive is as ambitious as it is complicated. 
This analysis will not deal with all the details of the project. Instead, 
it will consider the question of how the Commission itself sees the 
relationship between internal market and product safety policy, and seeks 
to compensate for the deficits found in the new harmonization policy.
1. The integration of product safety policy into internal market policy
The "explanatory note" to the Commission's proposal for a 
135directive and the recitals contain, disregarding surprising statements 
on the political manifestation of the Community^^, two lines of argument, 
both rooted in Article 100 a EEC. The first justificatory approach sounds 
familiar. The Commission refers to the diversity in "horizontal" 13456
133. See the Commission "Communication on a new impetus for consumer
protection policy", COM (85) 314 final of 23.7.1985 and the Council
Resolution thereon of 25.6.1986, O.J. C 167/1986, 1; "Communication from
the Commission on safety of consumers in relation to consumer products",
COM (87) 209 final of 8.5.1985 and the Council Resolution thereon of
25.6.1987 on the Safety of Consumers, O.J. C 176/1987, 3; see further the 
Council Resolution of 4.11.1988 on the participation of consumers in 
standardisation, O.J. C 293/1988, 1 as well as that of 9.11.1989 on the 
priorities of consumer policy, O.J. C 294/1989, 1.
134. O.J. C 193/1989, 1.
135. COM (89) 162 final of 7.6.1989, 2 f.



























































































legislation of Member States on product safety , to the autonomy of
national administrative authorities in verifying Community-law 
138presumptions of safety , and to the powers of action of Member States
139pursuant to Article 100 a (5) . All these references refer to legal and
administrative provisions that directly affect the functioning of the 
Common Market and therefore belong among the "classical" canons for 
justifying approximation of laws.
But this framework has already been broken by Article 100 a. The 
Community's policy of approximation of laws is made subject to qualitative 
requirements by the combined operation of Articles 100 a (4) and (5), 130
r and 130 t. It must base itself on a high level of protection (Article 
100 a (3)); it can achieve complete removal of barriers to trade, at least 
de facto, if it itself applies the relatively highest level of protection, 
and it must, if an obligation to protect life and health in Community law
is taken as a basis, at least respect measures by Member states against 
140newly recognized hazards
The Commission's proposal draws the conclusion that the policy of 
removing obstacles to trade caused by product safety law should be treated 
as Europeanization of product safety law, which takes the protection of 
life and health as a positive obligation on the Community. This is 
expressed partly in the extensive validity claims of the general product
safety obligation, which fills in the protective lacunae in secondary 
141Community law . It further emerges from the instruments of action to be
142introduced by Member States and coordinated at Community level 13789402
137. See the 2nd recital in the draft, and more thoroughly the Commission 
Communication of 8 May 1987 (fn. 133), 5 ff.
138. 5th and 13th recitals.
139. See COM (89) 162, 3.
140. See above at the end of II.1.
141. See especially 6th recital, and part 2 below.



























































































2. The tasks of a Community-law general cLause
The legislative description of general product safety obligations 
must answer two related questions. Firstly, it must name the criteria to 
be used for the legal assessment of product hazards, and secondly, it must
delimit the spheres of responsibility of product manufacturers and product 
143users . These two tasks are taken up in the Commission's draft with the 
objectively appropriate differentiation, though the drafting is obscure. 
The legal safety reference point of the draft appears in Article 2 in the
term "unacceptable risk" to safety and health. But this term must be read
in the context of the more detailed requirements on the form of products 
given in Article 2 b. It follows from Article 4 (1) that product users 
are also to be protected by suitable indications against "significant risk 
which is acceptable as such". In essence, then, the safety requirement in
the draft is no more restrictive than, for instance, the "unreasonable
144risk" formula of the American CPSA 1972 . The differentiation between
"significant" and "unacceptable" risk refers only to the need to adjust 
the measures required by safety law to the hazard potential of products -
and this proportionality requirement is in any case thoroughly taken
145account of in the draft . Put more specifically, the distinction 
between unacceptable risks, to be dealt with by design standards, and 
acceptable but significant hazards which merely require warning
instructions is too crude and is superfluous. A noteworthy point is the
explicit rejection of purely economic justifications of the legally 
binding level of safety (Article 3). This is in line with the normative 
approach of the draft - and with experience gained in the US with
proposals for a consistent orientation of safety-law assessments to cost-
. 146benefit analyses
143. See detailed in Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn. 11), 42 ff.
144. P.L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, for example Sec. 2 and 8.
145. Cf. 2nd recital and part 3 below.
146. On this see in more detail Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn. 11), 47 
ff., 220 ff., and the rejection of economic criteria for risk decisions by 
the US Congress: M. Schulenberg, The Law of Product Recall: A Comparative 
Analysis Between the Laws of the United States and the Federal Republic of 




























































































The draft operates similarly in distinguishing between the spheres 
of responsibility of manufacturers and product users. The general
provision of Article 2 (c) requires manufacturers to focus on "intended" 
use of a product under "normal circumstances" but also on "any other 
reasonably foreseeable" use. It is further evident from the provisions of
Article 9 on accident information systems that all product hazards that
147arise out of foreseeable ("not manifest or unforeseeable") misuse can 
justify measures by the authorities, and that warning instructions can be 
assessed as an adequate risk measure only when they prove actually 
effective (Article 7 (1) (d)).
For the regulatory functions of safety-law general clauses, their 
formulation is less important than the normative and institutional context 
in which they are to operate. The Commission's drafty is very carefui. in 
specifying this context. The normative value of the general product 
safety obligation is more closely defined by four principles:
- The product safety obligation is binding in Community law as a
whole. It does not in principle replace existing more detailed 
regulations; it should however fill regulatory lacunae and set a
standard which may not be lowered by more specific ("inadequate") 
148regulations . This comprehensive validity claim also means that 
product safety obligations binding according to the law of Member 
States are to be replaced by the Community-law standards. The 
standard mentioned in para. 3 (1) GSG, "generally recognized rules 
of technology" would accordingly be replaced by the more stringent 
"state of science and technology".
- The product safety obligation confirms the autonomy of the legal
assessment of safety risks. Here the draft is in line with the 
principles applying to the relationship between the legally binding 
safety objectives of the new directives and their specification 1478
147. On the terminology and its relationship with standardization 
principles applying in the Federal Republic see Ch. Joerges et al., op. 
cit., (fn. 11), 43 ff., 155 ff.




























































































through norms that are recognized and apply in product liability law 
149too . But the draft goes a step beyond these principles by 
explicitly allowing national authorities also to take measures where 
a product meets specific legal provisions but there is a basis for 
believing that an unacceptable risk is likely to be present (Article 
7 (2)). Similarly (and more certainly), intervention by the 
authorities can be considered where the safety conformity of 
products emerges only "having regard to the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge" or "good business practices" (Article 5 (2)). 
This principle is the clearest indication that the proposal sees the 
product safety obligation as the expression of a duty in Community 
law to protect life and health149 50 15.
The protective function of the general product safety obligation is 
hazard-related, not damage-related. This difference is rightly 
stressed in the Commission's explanations^51. Since the decision on 
a measure by the authorities depends on recognizable hazards, such 
action cannot alone prejudice the decision in liability law where 
there is a defect within the meaning of Article 6 of the product 
liability directive (cf. Article 16). Whether these differences in 
fact compel differing definitions of the product quality required in 
liability law and safety law, however, seems doubtful. Action by 
the authorities justified at the time of assessing a hazard does not 
prejudice the final assessment of the safety conformity of a 
product. The criteria mentioned in the proposal for this 
assessment, including the gradation between unacceptable risk and 
significant remaining risks (which in principle require only warning 
instructions) ought scarcely to differ from the viewpoints which 
are, pursuant to Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive, to
149. See Art. 7 d of the Product Liability Directive (fn. 3).
150. See above at the end of 1.




























































































decide the legitimacy of safety expectations
- The three specifications of the normative content of the product 
safety obligation mentioned so far, relate to legislative and 
administrative action. These "vertical" functions of the product 
safety duty supplement Article 6 with a "horizontal" dimension. 
This means that the product safety obligation entails not only tasks 
and powers for the authorities, but also organizational requirements 
and duties of response on " s u p p l i e r s " . The material content of 
these duties is explained in Annex 1 of the draft. It corresponds
to the organizational consequences developed in German law from the 
154product monitoring duty . Again, the product safety obligation in 
public law is more stringently oriented towards avoidance of hazards 
than a private-law product monitoring duty can bê "*"*.
3. Preventive harmonization of product safety legislation
The practical incorporation into law of the normative content of the 
public-law product safety obligation is dependent on suitable 
institutional and procedural measures. Here the Community must, both in 15234
152
152. See Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit., (fn. 11) 450 f. However, the 
Product Liability Directive excludes liability for development hazards 
(Article 7 (e)), whereas the Safety Directive's approach based on the 
emergence of hazards does make it possible to proceed against development 
hazards. But in product liability law too, the exclusion of liability for 
development hazards does not mean that products can continue to count as 
safe within the meaning of Article 6 once this hazardousness has become 
known. In German manufacturer liability law this aspect of transactional 
duties is in any case recognized: the product monitoring duties relate 
specifically to hazards not yet recognizable at the time of marketing.
153. On the concept see Article 2(d); the safety duties of importers, 
traders and other persons engaged in commerce correspond to the 
transactional duties on non-manufacturers in product liability or 
manufacturer liability law.
154. See C.E. Hauschka, 'Die vorbeugenden Organisations- und 
Produktbeobachtungspf1ichten des Herstellers in rechtlicher und 
unternehmerischer Sicht’, AG 1988, 29 ff., 38 ff. as well as J. Falke, op. 
cit. (fn. 9), 15 ff. with further references.
155. See 1.4 above. However, the proposal has omitted to introduce an 
obligation on suppliers to notify information on product hazards that 





























































































the interests of its internal market policy objectives and having regard 
to the "qualitative" commitment of its law-approximation policies take the 
relatively most developed examples in the product safety law of Member 
States as a guide. It cannot, however, meet the resulting requirements 
by, for instance, borrowing from the legislation of the Member State with 
the highest level all round, but must take the extent of the machinery of 
product safety policy in the various Member States into account and bring 
it into a coherent synthesis. In fact the Draft obliges Member States to 
extend their range of safety policy machinery to cover the whole spectrum 
of possibilities of government action. This step will undoubtedly bring 
about objections not only from a legal policy viewpoint but also from a 
purely legal one. To date, directives have required Member States in 
particular to comply with freedom to act; henceforth Member States are to 
be induced to take positive protective measures. But the duty to respect 
freedoms is hard to distinguish qualitatively from the duty to protect 
health and safety interests. If Community law may restrict the powers of 
Member States and their administrations in the interest of bringing about 
the internal market, then it must in principle also be possible to 
formulate the "quality" of the rules that flesh out the internal market in 
positive terms.
a) Information systems
A product safety policy that wishes to justify its approach needs 
data on accident figures and information on accident situations from which 
priorities can be derived and strategies to avoid risks developed. This 
task is one for accident information systems. The pioneer here was the 
American National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), built up 
after adoption of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 1972. It was 
internationally the first attempt at a data survey that would supply not 
only information on the numbers and consequences of accidents but also on 
the products involved'1'56. The American experience has been utilized by 
Britain to set up its Home Accidents Surveillance System (HASS) and by the 156




























































































Netherlands in their Prive Ongevallen Registratie Systeem (PORS)157 158960.
The Community's attempts to extend these initiatives into a European
project have met with considerable resistance. The Council Decision of 13 
158July 1981 confined itself - against further-reaching proposals from the 
159Commission - to the carrying out of a "model experiment" which left it 
up to Member States to determine the form of their participation and was 
de facto taken seriously by only three States1^ .  The Council's follow-up 
Decision of 22 April 1986 on the "European Home and Leisure Accident 
Surveillance System" (EHLASS)161 1623was adopted as a "demonstration project". 
Over a period of five years, data were collected Community wide. The
declared object of this project is to evaluate the data "with an eye to 
162accident prevention" . But this very evaluation is to be reserved to 
the final report on the demonstration project - and at present not even
the financial requirements for continued data collection seem to be 
,163guaranteed
The Commission's Draft and its explanatory statement exclude the 
controversies over the accident information systems and treat the issue of 
determining hazard pragmatically. Article 7 (d) merely prescribes minimum 
requirements for the setting up of national agencies, leaving Member 
States broad room for manoeuvre. But the Draft's reticence also has its 
programmatic components. The Commission is plainly aiming less at more or 
less perfect data collection than at a "responsive" bureaucratic structure 
that can take up approaches by consumer organizations, professional 
associations and workers (Article 7 (e )) and also engage in public debate 
on product hazards or respond to approaches by "public interest" groups or
157. On the British HASS see ibid., 119 f.; on the Dutch PORS see J.H.A. 
Bruggers and W.H.J. Rogmans, Registratie van ongevallen in de privesfeer, 
1982.
158. O.J. L 229/1981, 1.
159. O.J. C 252/1978, 2.
160. See Ch. Joerges et al., op. cit. (fn. 11), 289 f.
161. O.J. L 109/1986, 23.
162. The 6th recital of the Council Decision.
163. See the reference by J. Falke, 'Normungspolitik der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften und Schütz von Verbraucherun und Arbeitnehmern’, 




























































































organizations . Following experience with the accident information 
systems of the USA, Britain and the Netherlands164 65 167890, it would clearly be 
wrong to do entirely without systematic surveying of hazards. But the 
leeway the proposal allows Member States here (Article 9 (1)) is 
unproblematic insofar as the draft guarantees mutual information by Member
States, at any rate on serious risks of more than local importance 
166(Article 9(2)) 
b) Powers of action
"Although safeguard clauses in vertical Community legislation, in 
particular in texts following the "new approach", mention withdrawal from 
the market as a means of action to be taken by Member States' authorities
against unsafe products... they do not give any details in that 
167respect" - this explanation of the provisions on so-called follow-up
market control contained in Article 7 (1) of the Commission's Draft hits
168at a weakness not only of existing harmonization policy but also of
169product safety legislation in Member States
Article 7 (1) (c) responds to these shortcomings of follow-up market 
controls in Member States with a provision that is scarcely any more 
precise than the power provided for Member States in Article 7 of the new
directives to withdraw hazardous products "from the market or forbid or 
170restrict their marketing" . Article 7 (1) (c) of the Draft goes beyond 
these models only to the extent that it obliges Member States actually to 
equip their authorities with the "necessary powers". It is only through
164. In this connection see the liability rules in Article 17 (2).
165. See the references in fn. 156 f.
166. This provision is, moreover, intended to put the present accident 
information system (fn. 24 f. above) on "a more general level and on a 
firmer legal basis" (COM (89) 162, 10).
167. COM (89) 162, 10 f.
168. See above III.2.
169. See 1.4 above, and in detail the country reports in H.-W. Micklitz 
(ed), Post Market Control of Technical Consumer Goods (Commission- 
sponsored study, 1988), forthcoming.




























































































Annexe 2 of the Draft that it becomes clear what powers are meant. It 
provides in particular for:
- checks by the authorities on marketed products, and on suppliers' 
monitoring systems (Point 1)
- rights of information and investigation (Points 2 (a) and (b))
- requests to manufacturers to warn users or the public of hazards 
(Point 2 (e))
- public warnings (Point 2 (d)
- seizure of products and other marketing restrictions (Points 2 (g), 
(h) and (i) (cc))
- recall actions by manufacturers, either carried out voluntarily 
following an invitation, or ordered (Points 2 (i) (aa) and (bb)).
This list is of purely "indicative” significance. However, it 
follows from Article 12 (3) that Member States can, where necessary, be 
obliged by the Commission171 to carry out the investigations and checks 
mentioned in Points 2 (a)-(c) of the "indicative list". It further
follows from Article 11 (c) that the Commission can itself provisionally 
order the warnings, marketing restrictions and recalls specified in more 
detail in Points 2 (d)-(i) of the indicative list, in cases of grave and 
immediate risk. Moreover, by Article 8 (2), all measures of Member
States, thus including those against mere "unacceptable risks", can be 
verified at Community level where the risks are not of purely local 
importance. Accordingly, the indicative list in Annexe 2 takes on quite 
binding effect. Member States retain the freedom, in shaping their 
follow-up market controls, to base themselves on their existing 
administrative structures and regulatory traditions. But they must 
provide the whole list of instruments mentioned in Annexe 2.




























































































4. Europeanization of decision-making practice
For the years 1966-1987/ American statistics report, for the 
automobile sector alone, recall actions on 100 million cars, 7 million 
spare parts and 24.6 million tyres, with over 9 million recalls of 
vehicles in 1987. The Consumer Product Safety Commission, a fairly 
marginal agency by American standards, reports over 3000 actions for the 
period from 1973 to 1982, affecting 291 million products, and for the
subsequent period some hundred actions annually, each affecting some 5 
172million products . The idea that decisions on such a scale ought in 
future to lie with the Commission is obviously unrealistic, and hard to 
reconcile with the administrative competences that Member States in 
principle have. The Commission Draft at any rate brings in measures to 
avoid extensive involvement by the Commission in follow-up market
controls, and to distribute the decision-making burden arising over the
„ , , t . 173Commission’s departments
a) Emergencies
Measures of effect for the whole Community are envisaged by the 
Draft only for emergencies. An emergency is defined by Article 9 (1) and 
Articles 10 (1), 11 (1), as "grave and immediate risk". Such risks are by 
Article 9 (2) to be notified to the Commission if they have "not only
local effects"; likewise, the Commission is to be notified of a Member 
State's intention to take measures against grave and immediate risks of 
more than regional significance (Article 8 (1)); the Commission may also 
itself respond to such indications and call for information (Article 9 
(4)).
The "Commission's knowledge of the existence of a grave and 
immediate risk" is the "trigger mechanism" for the Community-law
procedures described in Articles 11-14:
172. See Ch. Joerges, Nachmarktkontrollen im amerikanischen Recht, 
typescript Bremen, Section 1.3.3 and 2.3.4 with further references.



























































































The consultation and investigation procedure pursuant to Article 12 
is provided for cases not yet ripe for decision. Here the 
Commission's powers are "in particular" confined to requesting 
Member States to carry out investigations and checks (Article 12 
(3), taken together with Annexe 2 (2) (a), (b), and (c)).
By contrast, the procedure of Article 14 provides for measures of 
direct effect in urgent cases. Such measures may be proposed and 
decided by the Commission (Article 14 (1)). They are to be
implemented by Member States within ten days, but apply initially 
for only six months (Article 14 (3) and (2)).
In the procedure of Article 14, additionally, national measures 
against grave and immediate product risks with more than local 
effects are checked (Article 8 (2), taken together with Article 10 
(2)).
b) Measures against "unacceptable" and "significant" risks
The Commission expects that "extreme situations" requiring treatment
at Community level will be relatively rare, and as a rule be
174satisfactorily solved with the exchange of relevant information . As 
appears from Article 8, however, the Commission must be informed of all 
planned national measures against "unacceptable" risks of more than 
regional importance. It can intervene in these national procedures with 
regulatory proposals of its own. Article 8 (2) provides further, however, 
that all notifiable measures be verified at Community level. According to 
these provisions, therefore, uniformity of practice in follow-up market 
controls should be guaranteed in all cases in which a Member State acts 
against unsafe products. Only those safety defects needing only warnings 
pursuant to Article 4 are excluded from verification at Community level.
5. Cooperation between Member States and the Commission.




























































































In the context of preparation of Commission decisions pursuant to 
Articles 11-14, but also in preparation of national measures pursuant to
Article 7 and the information exchange linked with the national 
175information systems , the Draft seeks to create a dense network of
cooperative relationships, which however not only guarantees the requisite 
information to provide knowledge of product hazards but also aims at 
Europeanization of risk assessment, instruments of action on safety and 
measures. Here the Draft takes a decisive step beyond the existing rapid 
information system. The importance, but also the difficulty, of this step 
is made clear by the Commission's explanations, which speak of a "great 
need" for a product safety "forum" to deal immediately with differences of
opinion between Member States and the Commission and make uniform measures 
176possible
The institutional consequences are drawn by Articles 13 and 14. The 
"Committee on product safety in emergencies" provided therein is to be set
up as an administrative committee within the meaning of the Council 
177decision of 13 July 1987
The status of the Committee on product safety emergencies as an 
administrative Committee is in striking contrast with the Standing 
Committee set up by the Standards Information Directive17 ,̂ which by the
Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 is to deal with all proposals for
179directives under the new approach , and also with Commission proposals
180for a European infrastructure for certification
The Committee for questions of standards has been set up as an 
Advisory Committee, although the issuing of contracts for standards and 
administration of the list of standards can affect safety policy interests 
of Member States for longer than the decisions to be taken in accordance
175. See above II.1 (fn. 24 f.).
176. See COM (89) 162, 3.
177. OJ L 197/1987, 33 (Procedure II, type a).
178. O.J. L 109/1983, 8; amended by Directive of 22.3.1988, O.J. L
181/1988, 75.
179. See section B IX of the Model Directive (fn. 80).




























































































with the Draft Product Safety Directive in emergency situations or in 
checking national measures. For certification, the Commission is aiming
at a private organizational structure (even though "with the prerequisite
181of appropriate political supervision" ), though at any rate with 
certification of products not conforming with standards, assessing their 
safety can hardly be easier than the risk assessments involved in follow­
up market control. The real reason is that measures that help to open up 
the market are to be facilitated, and those restricting free movement of 
goods are instead to be subject to controls by the Commission and other 
Member States.
In favour of the option for an advisory committee in standardization
is the consideration that this committee can, firstly, have recourse to
182the continuing work of the standards organizations and secondly that its 
decisions always have only a presumptive effect. On the other hand, with 
the control procedures of the General Product Safety Directive, a European 
"safety philosophy" has still to be developed. But these viewpoints have
limited relevance. On the one hand, there will be routine decisions in
183the area of follow-up market control too . On the other hand, the
decisions needed in safeguard clause procedures concerning the 
justification of objections to standards and certificates or questioning 
the recognition of a national test centre also concern safety policy 
interests of Member States. This is also true of disputes as to the 
justifiability of measures by Member States.
More stringent structuring of committees in the area of 
standardization and product safety law should start with the Community's 
and Member States' obligation to protect life and health. It follows from 
this protective obligation that decisions on the legally required level of 
safety may not be delegated to private organizations and that
181. See the Commission Document on the "global concept" for 
certification of 29.11.1988 (fn. 104), 25.
182. So that the choice of administrative committee procedure under the 
construction products directive is entirely consistent (fn. 87).
183. In this connection see COM (89) 162, 4: the mere exchange of




























































































institutional prerequisites for adapting safety standards in force and for 
intervening against newly recognized hazards have to be created. 
Considering the Community's substantive commitments and the powers allowed 
Member States by Article 100 (a) (4) and (5) EEC, it is only consistent to 
treat the questions of principle on product safety policy and assessment 
of newly recognized hazards as a joint task of Community and Member 
States. These considerations militate in favour of choosing the procedure 
of the administrative committee in all cases where Member States call for 
measures against newly recognized hazards or assert the inadequacy of 
standards accepted by the Community. For the decisions envisaged in the 
general product safety directive, however, this applies probably only 
where the Commission or Member States recognize "unacceptable risks" 
despite a product's compliance with Community or national provisions, and 
call for or take measures to remove them (cf. Article 7 (2), taken
together with Article 5 (1)). It might be best to confine the choice of 
the procedure of the administrative committee to such situations. It 
would then be consistent, however, to give the Standing Committee on
standardization the same status, to the extent that it has to deal with
184the extension of standards under Community law 
V. Final remark
At present one can do no more than speculate as to the further 
destiny of the Commission's proposal. But the relevance of the approaches 
adopted by the proposal is not thereby affected. It is part of the 
"logic" of achieving the internal market for the Community to become ever 
more deeply involved in the areas of responsibility assigned to Member 
States by Article 36 EEC, and it is an unavoidable consequence of this 
"approfondissement" of the integration process that Community solutions to 
regulatory tasks will also have to be found - and the proposal for a 
Directive on General Product Safety well documents this new quality of 
European integration.
184. See the considerations in Joerges et al., op. cit., (fn. 11), 385 
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